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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
For this installment of the Recent Developments, we consider six
recent Florida Supreme Court decisions. First, we consider Maddox
v. State,1 where the court interpreted the phrase “any trial” in section
316.650(9), Florida Statutes (2001), as excluding citations for forgery
only from matters related to motor vehicles and not literally from
“any trial,” despite the statute’s plain language.2 Next, we consider
Bush v. Holmes,3 where the court held the state law authorizing a
system of vouchers known as the Opportunity Scholarship Program

1. 31 Fla. L. Weekly S24 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2006).
2. Judith Brodkin contributed this Note.
3. 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
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(OSP) violated the Florida Constitution.4 Riggs v. State (Riggs II)5 is
the court’s most recent treatment of the exigent circumstances exception.6 Then, we examine Florida Department of Revenue v. City of
Gainesville,7 where the court upheld the facial constitutionality of
statutes imposing ad valorem taxes on telecommunication services
owned by a municipality.8 Costarell v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission9 examines the court’s holding that state agencies
are bound by controlling judicial statutory interpretations.10 Our final Note takes up Wilson v. Salamon,11 where the court created a
bright-line rule that court orders entered to resolve good faith motions should automatically be treated as activity, thus precluding
dismissal for lack of record activity.12
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS
SECTION 316.650(9), FLORIDA STATUTES, TO MEAN THAT CITATIONS
FOR FORGERY ARE ONLY EXCLUDED FROM MATTERS RELATED TO
MOTOR VEHICLES AND NOT LITERALLY “ANY TRIAL”—Maddox v. Florida, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S24 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2006).
Statutory interpretation is an important tool that judges use in
deciding cases, but unless the statute is facially ambiguous, the
courts must yield to the plain meaning put forth by the legislature.13
When courts start using context, legislative history, and legislative
purpose, they head down a slippery slope, which can lead to courts
substituting their own judgments for that of the legislature. Statu-

4. Katy Donlan contributed this Note.
5. 918 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2005).
6. Rachael Kaiman contributed this Note and would like to thank Florida State University College of Law Professor B.J. Priester for his invaluable insights.
7. 918 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 2005).
8. Rachael Kaiman contributed this Note and would like to thank Donna Blanton,
Esq. with Radey Thomas Yon & Clark, P.A. for her invaluable insights.
9. 916 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 2005).
10. Katy Donlan contributed this Note and would like to thank Florida State University College of Law Legal Writing Instructor Susan Bodell for her invaluable insights.
11. 923 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2005).
12. Judith Brodkin contributed this Note.
13. See, e.g., Maddox v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S24, S26 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2006)
(Cantero, J., dissenting) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla.
1931) (“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear
and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.”));
McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998) (“When the language of the statute
is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion
for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be
given its plain and obvious meaning.”); State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973) (“Where
the legislative intent as evidenced by a statute is plain and unambiguous, then there is no
necessity for any construction or interpretation of the statute and the courts need only give
effect to the plain meaning of its terms.”).
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tory interpretation should be used only when the plain meaning of
the statute would lead to an unreasonable conclusion.14
The majority opinion in Maddox v. State15 has blurred the separation of powers within Florida by substituting the court’s own interpretation of the statute in place of the legislature’s plain meaning.
The issue in Maddox was whether the phrase “any trial” in section
319.650(9), Florida Statutes,16 was clear and required no interpretation or whether it was ambiguous and required interpretation.17 The
majority chose the latter position, disapproving of the decision in
Dixon v. State18 and upholding the result reached by the lower court
in Maddox v. State.19 The court reasoned:
When section 316.650 is read in the context in which it is found
and in conjunction with related statutory provisions, the reasonable construction of this statutory provision is that the Legislature
intended only to exclude traffic citations in a more limited fashion
in matters with issues related to the operation, maintenance or
use of the motor vehicle. To hold otherwise would expand the scope
of this statute unreasonably and lead to absurd results.20

This Note explores the reasoning of the majority and dissent. It puts
forth the argument that the majority should not have swayed from
the plain meaning of the statute because, although the result of applying the plain meaning may not have been ideal, it was not unreasonable. Whether to allow an exception for citations to be introduced
into evidence pursuant section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes, was a
decision for the legislature, not the court.
This case involved a routine traffic stop by a Polk County deputy
sheriff.21 The driver, Robert Maddox, gave the officer a false name
(“Nathaniel Lewis Maddox”), and the officer issued an improper lane
change citation and a citation for failure to produce proof of insurance to Nathanial Maddox.22 During the traffic stop, a second deputy
searched the car and found an identification card that identified
Maddox as Robert Edwin Maddox.23 It was discovered that Robert
Maddox’s driver’s license was suspended, so the first deputy kept the
first two citations he had issued to Nathaniel Maddox and issued a

14. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984).
15. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S24 (majority opinion).
16. FLA. STAT. § 316.650(9) (2001) (“Such citations shall not be admissible evidence in
any trial.”).
17. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S24.
18. 812 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
19. 862 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S24.
20. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S25-26.
21. Id. at S24.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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new citation to Robert Maddox for driving with a suspended license.24
While Maddox was in custody, he admitted that Nathaniel was his
brother, and he was charged with two counts of forgery for signing
the citations issued to Nathaniel and with two counts of uttering a
forged instrument.25
The forged traffic citations were allowed into evidence during the
trial, and Maddox was convicted. This created a conflict with the
First District Court of Appeal’s (“First District”) decision in Dixon
where the court held that the language of section 319.650(9), Florida
Statutes, (2001) was unambiguous and not subject to judicial interpretation.26 The Second District Court of Appeal (“Second District”)
addressed the argument that the forged traffic tickets were inadmissible pursuant to section 319.650(9), by concluding that the tickets
“were not citations as contemplated by the statute, but rather were
documentary evidence of Maddox’s criminal conduct.”27
The Florida Supreme Court upheld Maddox’s conviction by resorting to statutory interpretation. The majority explored chapter 316,
Florida Statutes, entitled “Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law,” in
which the statute at issue was found.28 It looked at the purpose of the
Act and the description of the bill from when it was enacted in 1971,
and it determined that “a strict literal reading of the phrase ‘any trial,’
as suggested by Maddox and endorsed by the First District in Dixon,
would inappropriately extend the effects of this statutory provision far
beyond the scope of that which was intended by the Legislature.”29 The
majority also agreed with the Second District’s reasoning.30
Another statutory interpretation tool the majority used was to examine in context how the term “any trial” fit within the larger statute and if its meaning was consistent with the entire chapter. The
example used by the court was another statute from chapter 316
which states that “neither a crash report nor a statement made in
24. Id.
25. Id. at S24.
26. See generally Dixon v. State, 812 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). After being
stopped by an officer for several traffic violations, Dixon gave a false name to the officer.
The name was placed on the traffic ticket, which Dixon signed using the false name. He
was charged with forgery under section 831.01, Florida Statutes, (2000) and driving without a valid driver’s license. The First District determined that the language of section
319.650(9) was unambiguous and not subject to judicial interpretation. The court held that
the language in section 319.650(9) required exclusion of forged citations in the State’s
prosecution of forgery. Dixon, 812 So. 2d 595.
27. The Second District determined that the trial court did not err in allowing the
traffic citations into evidence because the purpose of the statute was to protect the person
to whom the citation was issued, and the charges of the first two tickets were not pending
against anyone because they were withdrawn after it was discovered that Robert was not
Nathaniel. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S24.
28. Id. at S25.
29. Id.
30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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connection with such a report ‘shall be used as evidence in any trial,
civil or criminal.’ ”31 The majority construed this as meaning that the
phrase “any trial” in section 316.650(9) “was intended to refer to the
use of traffic citations in proceedings in which the manner or method
of the operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle is the issue in controversy” because it was not followed by “civil or criminal.”32
The majority’s final point was that interpreting “any trial” to mean
all proceedings in a court of law would lead to “unreasonable or ridiculous” results.33 Interpreting the statute this way, the majority suggested, would do away with all prosecutions for forgery of traffic citations because in order to convict a person of forgery, the State must
show that the alleged forged document is, in fact, a “public document”
within section 831.01, Florida Statutes,34 and it would be unable to do
that if it could not introduce the actual document.35 The majority attempted to quell the dissent’s argument that the citation may contain
“unflattering, legally irrelevant information” and prejudice the defendant by suggesting that the unflattering information may be redacted
if it does not relate to the forgery charge.36
Justice Cantero dissented in an opinion in which Chief Justice
Pariente and Justice Quince concurred. The dissent agreed with the
First District’s holding in Dixon and the argument by Maddox that
the statute was unambiguous; therefore, it argued that the plain
meaning of the statute should have applied to this case.37 Justice
Cantero stated that the statute was simple and clear because the
phrase “ ‘[a]ny trial’ means literally any trial.”38 The dissent concluded that the legislature could have a rational basis for excluding
traffic citations from all trials and the decision to allow the use of citations should be left to the legislature.39 The dissent cited Dixon and
two other cases where courts held that traffic citations were not admissible in any trial.40
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s analysis that since the
crash report provision includes the words “civil or criminal” after “any
31. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S25 (citing FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4) (2001)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. FLA. STAT. § 831.01 (2005).
35. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S25.
36. Id.
37. Id. at S26 (Cantero, J., dissenting). The dissent analyzed the plain meaning of the
statute as being the most reliable expression of legislative intent and stated if the statute
is unambiguous, the court is not authorized to interpret it another way; therefore, the
plain meaning must be honored. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Dixon v. State, 812 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)); see State v. Veilleux, 859 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), review denied, 880 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 2004); State
v. Martinez, 870 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
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trial,” that it is more expansive than “any trial” without the modifiers
in section 316.650(9).41 The dissent argued that “any trial” by itself is
“as expansive as possible” and adding a modifier like “civil or criminal”
would only emphasize or even restrict the provision’s scope.42
The dissent argued that the court should only substitute its own
judgment when absolutely necessary and, in this case, the plain
meaning of the statute would not lead to an absurd result; therefore,
the court should not have substituted its judgment for that of the legislature.43 The dissent stated that “[t]he absurdity doctrine should be
reserved for cases where applying the plain meaning would border on
irrationality,” because a broader application of the doctrine would
“threaten to undermine the separation of powers.”44 In this case, citations, while probative in forgery trials, “still pose a substantial risk of
prejudice to the defendant,” and the legislature could have decided
that the burden outweighed the benefit.45
The dissent gave three reasons why the legislature could reasonably allow citations to be purely procedural and not allow them in
“any trial.”46 First, it allows the defendant to confront the officer by
ensuring the officer shows up in court and gives firsthand testimony,
rather than relying on the ticket.47 Second, citations should be omitted from “any trial” because it “ensure[s] that officers will testify only
about the facts they witnessed, rather than their legal relevance.”48
Third, excluding citations will protect defendants “from the prejudice
caused by unflattering, legally irrelevant information recorded on the
citation.”49 What an officer thinks is factually pertinent to the traffic
stop can be different from what a court will find legally relevant.50
The dissent also argued that the ticket could prejudice the defendant in a forgery trial because the jury could believe that the defendant actually committed the underlying traffic offense, which could
influence its decision on the forgery charge.51 The dissent pointed out
that this discussion does not suggest that traffic citations should be
excluded, only that it would not be absurd to exclude them.52 The dissent reiterated, “In the absence of absurdity, we have a responsibility
to the Legislature, which carefully selected the words, and to defen41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S26-27.
Id.
Id. at S27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at S27-28.
Id. at S28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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dants, whose liberty possibly hinges upon them, to enforce the statute as written.”53
The majority’s holding oversteps the judiciary’s boundary by taking on the legislature’s role. Allowing the judiciary to substitute its
own judgment of what a statute means any time it thinks an outcome
is unjust is a serious breach of separation of powers.54 This holding
gives power to the judiciary that it should not have, as it could open
the door for courts to apply their own interpretations to statutes
whenever the outcome does not fit with the courts’ ideals.
The term “any,” has been the center of other statutory interpretation controversies. A federal firearms statute that contained the
phrase “any court” caused a circuit split over whether that phrase
meant domestic and foreign courts, or just domestic courts.55 In
Small v. United States,56 the Supreme Court put the controversy to
rest by holding that the phrase referred only to domestic courts, but
as the dissent argued, that decision was unfounded and unwise.57 For
many of the same reasons argued by the dissent in Small, the outcome in Maddox should have been different.58
The dissent in Maddox has convincingly argued that the statute’s
plain meaning is not absurd and that the plain meaning should have
been followed.59 The cases that have followed Dixon and interpreted
“any court” to literally mean “any court” are strong evidence that the

53. Id. For a discussion on the circuit split, see Tracey A. Basler, Does “Any” Mean
“All” or Does “Any” Mean “Some”? An Analysis of the “Any Court” Ambiguity of the Armed
Career Criminal Act and Whether Foreign Convictions Count as Predicate Convictions, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 147 (2003).
54. Lee G. Lester, Note, Small v. United States: Defining “Any” as a Subset of “Any,”
40 U. RICH. L. REV. 631, 650 (2006) (“The fact that the court might have drawn the line differently is not a matter for judicial, but for legislative action. In the wake of Small, however, future courts may usurp the power of Congress by following the majority rationale
and loosely construing or even inventing new canons of statutory interpretation instead of
following the law as it has been codified.”).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted
in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition . . . .”).
56. 125 S. Ct. at 1752 (2005).
57. Id.; see also Lester, supra note 54, at 631 (siding with the dissent in Small).
58. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1764 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Pub. Citizen v. DOJ,
491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“[Unpopular results]
certainly present no occasion to employ, nor does the Court invoke, the canon against absurdities. We should employ that canon only ‘where the result of applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that Congress
could have intended the result . . . and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone.’ ”).
59. For a discussion of the prejudicial value of traffic citations, see Sheryl L. Musgrove & David W. Gross, Use of a Traffic Citation in a Subsequent Related Civil Proceeding, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 135 (1996).
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statute’s plain meaning should have been adhered to in Maddox.60 In
addition, the legislature recently amended this statute narrowly to
allow the admission of traffic citations to prove forgery and a few
other specific instances.61 If “any trial” really only referred to “proceedings in which the manner or method of the operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle is the issue in controversy,”62 the legislature
could have amended the statute that way, but it did not. Statutes can
always be interpreted in some way to seem ambiguous. If courts are
allowed to find the slightest ambiguity and tweak the law to favor
their outcome, the legislature will become much weaker. Statutes
may not always appear to be logical, and some may even seem unwise, but as long as the plain meaning is unambiguous and any rational explanation can be determined, the court should adhere to that
plain meaning.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS USE OF
PUBLIC MONIES TO FUND PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS
VIOLATES THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION—Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d
392 (Fla. 2006).
The Florida Constitution requires that the State provide for “the
education of all children residing within its borders . . . a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools
that allows students to obtain a high quality education.”63 In the
most recent case concerning the continuing controversy over school
vouchers, the Florida Supreme Court held the state law, authorizing
a system of vouchers known as the Opportunity Scholarship Program
(OSP), violated this constitutional mandate.64 In its landmark decision, Bush v. Holmes, the Florida Supreme Court became the first
court nationwide to hold that the state has “a duty to educate students in public schools.”65
The OSP was one of several educational reforms at the center of
Governor Jeb Bush’s A+ Plan for Education, designed to implement
standards for student achievement, assess and publish educational
performance, and provide a system of accountability for schools based
60. See cases cited supra note 40; see also Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola v. Stone,
650 So. 2d 676, 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding evaluation based on traffic citation should
have been excluded under section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes).
61. FLA. STAT. § 316.650(9) (2005) (“Such citations shall not be admissible evidence in
any trial, except when used as evidence of falsification, forgery, uttering, fraud, or perjury,
or when used as physical evidence resulting from a forensic examination of the citation.”).
62. Maddox v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S24, S25 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2006).
63. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
64. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006); see also FLA. STAT. § 1002.38 (2005).
65. Greg Toppo, Florida Supreme Court Strikes Down School Vouchers, USA TODAY,
Jan. 5, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-01-05-florida-schoolvouchers_x.htm?POE=NEWISVA.
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upon performance results.66 A cornerstone of this educational initiative is the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT), taken
annually by public school students in grades three through eleven.67
Based upon both student FCAT “performance and progress,” individual schools are graded A, B, C, D or F, with schools receiving an F
designated as failing.68 The OSP provided two alternatives for students who were in public schools found by the State to be failing for
two out of four consecutive years. The student could either attend a
nonfailing public school, or the student’s share of public education
funds could be applied towards tuition for an eligible private school.69
Requirements for private school eligibility included, among other
things, antidiscrimination provisions, compliance with local health
and safety codes, curriculum deemed appropriate by a private school
accrediting body, and acceptance of a student’s pro rata share of public education funds as full tuition and fees.70 As the majority in Bush
v. Holmes pointed out, “the private school’s curriculum and teachers
are not subject to the same standards” as public schools.71
In Bush v. Holmes, parents of children in Florida public schools as
well as numerous organizations, including teacher’s unions and the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), brought suit in circuit court
alleging that the OSP was unconstitutional under article I, section 3
and article IX, sections 1 and 6 of the Florida Constitution, as well as
attacking its federal constitutionality under the Establishment
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.72 Before the suit reached the Florida
Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a voucher program similar to Florida’s OSP, the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship
Program, did not violate the constitutional requirements of the Establishment Clause.73 This decision led to a voluntary dismissal of
plaintiff’s claims of unconstitutionality under the Establishment
Clause.74 In its decision, the Florida Supreme Court was faced only
with the determination of whether the portion of the OSP enabling
students of underperforming public schools to use public funding for
a private education violated the Florida Constitution.75
The majority found the OSP violated the Florida Constitution and
based its opinion upon three findings. First, free public schools are
66. See A+ Plan for Education, http://eogtmp.sto.fl.gov/html/a__plan_for_education.html
(last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. FLA. STAT. § 1002.38(2)(a), (3) (2005).
70. Id. § 1002.38(4).
71. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 409 (Fla. 2006).
72. Id. at 397-99.
73. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
74. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 399.
75. Id.
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the sole means prescribed by the constitution “for the state to provide
for the education of Florida’s children.”76 Second, the OSP voucher
system diverts funding from public schools into private schools to the
detriment of the constitutionally required, high quality, free public
schools.77 Finally, because private schools are not subject to the same
standards and regulations as public schools, the constitutional requirement of uniformity is not met.78
In its precedent holding that public schools are the exclusive means
constitutionally authorized for supplying the educational needs of
Florida’s children, the court relied almost entirely upon the principles
of statutory construction, specifically in pari materia, which requires
statutes be construed together in order to resolve inconsistencies,79
and expressio unius est exclusion alterius, or “the expression of one
thing implies the exclusion of another.”80 Historically, the court has
used expressio unis to prevent the legislature from enacting a statute
that would defeat the purpose of a constitutional provision prescribing
a specific manner of performance.81 In Holmes, the court conceded that
application of this principle is limited to situations in which a statute
conflicts with the “primary purpose of the relevant constitutional provision,”82 and it stated (rather than demonstrated) that the OSP at issue presents just such an applicable occasion. Through utilization of
both in pari materia and expressio unis, the court found article IX, section 1(a) serves as both a mandate (it is the “paramount duty of the
state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders”)83 and a “restriction on the execution of this
mandate”84 (“made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure and
high quality system of free public schools”85).
Although the majority opinion represents the current state of the
law in this area, its persuasive force was weakened by an impressively reasoned dissent supported by drafter intent. The dissent begins by criticizing the majority’s alleged failure to follow the most
fundamental principal of statutory construction, that legislation be
presumed constitutional and every effort made to resolve any doubt
in favor of constitutionality.86 It goes on to present the text of article

76. Id. at 398.
77. Id. at 409.
78. Id. at 409-10.
79. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004).
80. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 407.
81. See Weinberger v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of St. Johns County, 112 So. 253, 256
(Fla. 1927).
82. See Bush, 919 So. 2d at 408.
83. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
84. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 406.
85. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
86. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 413 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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IX, section 1 as plain and unambiguous with no textual exclusivity
requirement either expressed or implied87 and lacking any evidence
that voters or drafters intended to preclude the legislature from providing public funds for private alternatives to failing schools.88 The
dissent supported its claims of intended consequence with the comments from one member of the Constitution Revision Commission,
who stated the Commission’s goal was to “raise the constitutional
standard for education,” and “does not address” “the education of our
children in the state mov[ing] in various directions, whether it be
charter schools, private schools, [or] public schools.”89 Likewise, the
dissent pointed to comments of other commissioners “that the
amendments to article IX should not limit the legislature’s authority
to determine the best method for providing education in Florida.”90
The dissent provided a compelling case that article IX neither expressly or impliedly limits the legislature’s ability to educate children
exclusively to public schools, nor was it intended to do so.
In further scrutiny, the reasoning of the majority and its application of expressio unis lacks logical flow. As previously mentioned, the
court distinguished its failure to follow this tenant of statutory construction in another case based upon its determination that the statute then at issue was not in conflict with the “primary purpose of the
relevant constitutional provision.”91 In Holmes, however, the court offered a thorough discussion of the language and history of the educational articles of Florida’s Constitution ultimately stating that they
impose “a maximum duty on the State to provide for education.”92 If
one concludes this to be the “primary purpose of the relevant constitutional provision,”93 it is unclear then why the court chose to apply
expressio unis without first demonstrating the conflict between the
OSP and the State’s duty to provide for education.

87. Id. at 416 (“This mandate is to make adequate provision for a public school system. The text does not provide that the government’s provision for education shall be ‘by’
or ‘through’ a system of free public schools.”).
88. Id. at 416-17.
89. Id. at 419.
90. Id. at 420; see also Florida Constitution Revision Commission, Meeting Proceedings for January 15th, 1998, at 296-97, http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/minutes.html [hereinafter CRC Jan. 15] (statement of Commissioner Thompson expressing a desire to ensure the
legislature retains the freedom to determine how best to provide education); Florida Constitution Revision Commission, Meeting Proceedings for February 26, 1998, at 54-55,
http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/minutes.html (statement of Commissioner Evans conveying
fear that the heightened importance of education in article IX would transfer power from
the voters to the courts); CRC Jan. 15, supra, at 262-69 (statement of Commissioner Langley expressing concern that the heightened importance of education in article IX would
transform the Florida Supreme Court into the State Board of Education).
91. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 408 (majority opinion).
92. Id. at 404.
93. Id. at 408.
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Regardless of how persuasive one finds the court’s use of statutory
construction to invalidate OSP, the court’s second finding appears
significantly less persuasive. The majority reasoned that in diverting
public funds from public to private schools, “the OSP by its very nature undermines the system of ‘high quality’ free public schools,”94
and holds that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the state from using public monies to fund a private alternative to the public school system.”95
However, as the dissent points out, there was no evidence brought in
the facial challenge to the OSP that this program was resulting in a
less than high quality system of free public schools.96 Additionally,
the dissent noted that while article IX, section 6 has been in Florida’s
Constitution for over 150 years, it has never been held to proscribe
the State from providing public funds to institutions of private education and provided a lengthy list of such occasions.97
Finally, the majority based its opinion upon the finding that since
private schools are not subject to the same standards, regulation, and
control as public schools, they violate the criterion put forth in article
IX, section 1(a) that Florida’s system of free public schools be uniform.98 However, this seems to be the majority’s least relevant finding as the alternative of public funding for a private education seemingly would not affect the uniformity of the system of free public
schools required. As the statute appears only to speak to the requirements of this free system of public schools, it seems quite a
stretch to find the lack of identical qualifications for private schools
not in compliance with the uniformity requirement of public schools.
The majority in Bush v. Holmes attempted to limit the scope and implications of its decision specifically delineating “Other Programs Unaffected.”99 Here, the court distinguished the OSP from another educational program which provides public funding to private schools for exceptional students where there is a lack of special services in the student’s school district.100 The court stated that such a program for exceptional students is “structurally different from the OSP, which provides a
systematic private school alternative.”101 The court did not, however,
address other scholarship programs such as the John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program, the largest and fastestgrowing scholarship program in Florida,102 which allows parents to
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 409.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 415 (Bell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 421-23.
Id. at 410 (majority opinion).
Id. at 411.
Id.
Id. at 412.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EDUCATION &
PARENTAL CHOICE, JOHN M. MCKAY SCHOLARSHIPS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
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chose whether to send their child to a public or private school on public
funding without the requirement that the public school be unable to accommodate the special needs of the student, or Florida’s Corporate Tax
Credit Scholarship program, which allows tax credits for corporations
providing underprivileged students scholarships to attend private
schools.103 While Department of Education statistics show the OSP provided scholarships to only 733 children in the 2005-2006 school year,104
over 16,144 students took advantage of McKay Scholarships,105 and
13,497 participated in the Corporate Tax Credit Scholarship program
during this same school year.106 Although the Bush v. Holmes opinion
seems ominous for these other programs, the educational fate of nearly
30,000 students, for now, remains unknown.
Ultimately, the dissent in Bush v. Holmes comes across as the more
intellectually honest discussion of the challenged litigation, relevant
constitutional provisions, and powers delegated to both the legislature
and judiciary. Though this perspective did not prevail, it is unlikely
this case will serve as the final word in Florida’s ongoing debate over
the validity of vouchers. While Governor Bush intends to “look for
ways to continue the voucher programs, including private funding,
changing state law and amending the Florida Constitution,”107 this decision will likely serve as difficult precedent for proponents of Florida’s
two largest scholarship programs to overcome.
CRIMINAL LAW—SCOPE OF THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
EXCEPTION—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT UNDER THE
SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED, A WARRANTLESS ENTRY WAS
JUSTIFIED BASED UPON A REASONABLE BELIEF OF MEDICAL
EMERGENCY—Riggs v. State (Riggs II), 918 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2005).
The Fourth Amendment108 protects citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures and generally requires a warrant, based on
PROGRAM, http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/McKay/files/Fast_Facts_McKay.pdf
(last visited Mar. 16, 2006) [hereinafter MCKAY SCHOLARSHIPS].
103. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EDUCATION & PARENTAL
CHOICE, CORPORATE TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM, http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/
Information/CTC/fast_facts.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2006) [hereinafter CORPORATE TAX CREDIT
SCHOLARSHIPS].
104. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EDUCATION &
PARENTAL CHOICE, OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM, http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/
Information/OSP/files/Fast_Facts_OSP.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
105. MCKAY SCHOLARSHIPS, supra note 102.
106. CORPORATE TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIPS, supra note 103.
107. Bill Kaczor, Florida Supreme Court Declares Vouchers Unconstitutional, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 5, 2006, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/13556951.htm.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
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probable cause for a search or seizure.109 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court has specifically stated that “physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”110 However, the Amendment does not guarantee that a search
of an individual’s home will never be made absent consent or a warrant, only that a search will not be “unreasonable.”111 In accordance
with this understanding, the Court has recognized limited exceptions
whereby a warrantless entry would be justified, one of which is known
as the “exigent circumstances”112 exception. This exception deals with
an “emergency or dangerous situation . . . that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or
search.”113 Recently, the Florida Supreme Court explored the scope of
the exigent circumstances exception in Riggs v. State (Riggs II).114 Resolving a conflict between the First and Second District Courts of Appeal, the court unanimously held that two sheriff’s deputies acted in
conformity with the Fourth Amendment and within the bounds of the
exigent circumstances exception when they were called to an apartment complex, found a four-year old child had been wandering there
naked and alone, made reasonable inferences that there was a medical
emergency of a caretaker, and thus entered an apartment without a
warrant.115 Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court should
not have suppressed evidence of marijuana that was in plain view and
seized after the warrantless entry.116 Although the court’s opinion appears simple, straightforward, and persuasive, the result has many
potential implications in the area of search and seizure law and for the
parameters of the exigent circumstances exception. This Note briefly
explores the facts and foundational law related to Riggs II and then
addresses concerns stemming from the opinion. Ultimately, this Note
questions the certainty and confidence with which the court provided
its holding and questions whether the exigent circumstances exception
has been overbroadened.
In rendering its decision, the court sided with the Second District
in Florida v. Riggs (Riggs I),117 finding that exigent circumstances

109. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
110. Id. (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
111. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990).
112. Payton, 445 U.S. at 583.
113. Id.
114. 918 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2005).
115. Id. at 282.
116. Id. at 283. See also Davis v. State, 834 So. 2d 322, 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). “[I]f
the police enter a home under exigent circumstances and, prior to making a determination
that the exigency no longer exists, find contraband in plain view, they may lawfully seize
the illegal items.” Id.
117. 890 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
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justified a warrantless entry, and disapproved of Eason v. State,118
the First District’s case with similar facts, to the extent that it conflicted with the court’s opinion in Riggs II.119 In Eason, a woman
called the police after taking a child into her home, whom she had
found wandering in the parking lot of her apartment complex.120 The
child appeared to be about two or three years old and, with the police
nearby, specifically pointed to the front door of an apartment and
said his mother was inside.121 After receiving no response to knocks,
the police entered the apartment because they were concerned there
may have been a burglary or someone inside in need of help.122 The
officers found the child’s caretaker but no emergency, and they also
found marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view.123 The trial court
denied Eason’s motion to suppress the evidence seized, finding the
entry was lawful.124 The First District reversed, however, concluding
that the officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe exigent
circumstances existed.125 The court stated the officers lacked reasonable grounds for such a belief since there was no indication the child
had been abused or was in danger of abuse, no evidence suggesting a
need for medical assistance, and no evidence of a murder or robbery.126 Dissenting, Chief Judge Smith agreed with the trial court
that the warrantless entry was reasonable, based upon the officers’
concern for the condition of the child’s mother.127 Chief Judge Smith
expressed the view that the majority’s focus on the safety and welfare of the child was misplaced.128 “[T]his episode developed substantially beyond a mere ‘lost child’ incident”129 and the need to act was
clear and within the scope of police duties.130
In Riggs I and II, two sheriff’s deputies were summoned to a Florida apartment complex at three o’clock one January morning.131 A
four-year-old girl had been seen walking there, naked and alone, although by the time the deputies arrived she was within the custody
of local residents.132 The child could not identify which apartment
118. 546 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
119. Riggs II, 918 So. 2d at 276.
120. Eason, 546 So. 2d at 58.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 59.
126. Id. at 58-59.
127. Id. at 61 (Smith, C.J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 60-61.
129. Id. at 61.
130. Id. at 60-61 (quoting the scope of police duties that may lead to the need for entry
of private premises without a warrant from WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.6 (2d ed. 1987)).
131. Riggs v. State (Riggs II), 918 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 2005).
132. Id.
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was her own, and the deputies decided to try and find the child’s
caregiver by searching the three-story complex door by door.133 When
searching the second level, the deputies found that all the doors were
closed except one, which was open slightly and through which officers could see some light.134 After pounding on the door, identifying
themselves, and receiving no response, the officers entered the
apartment, believing that it was the apartment from which the child
had come and that something had happened to the child’s caregiver.135 After entering, the officers found on a coffee table a plastic
cigar tube containing seeds, which later were established to be marijuana, and seven potted marijuana plants in the second of three
rooms they sequentially checked.136 In the third room, the officers
found Norris Riggs and a woman whom the officers later discovered
was the child’s babysitter.137 Riggs was arrested and confessed to
growing marijuana but pled not guilty and moved to suppress the
evidence of marijuana.138 At the suppression hearing, the State alleged that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry, and
thus, the officers were able to seize items in plain view.139 Basing its
ruling on Eason, the trial court granted the motion to suppress.140 On
appeal, the Second District reversed, adopting the reasoning of Chief
Judge Smith’s dissent in Eason.141 Expressing the view that the officers entered the apartment based on their duty to assure the welfare
of the child’s caregiver and based on circumstances justifying such a
concern, the court concluded the warrantless entry was justified and
therefore items in plain view could lawfully be seized.142
The Florida Supreme Court agreed to review Riggs I in order to resolve the conflict between the First and Second Districts related to the
application and scope of the exigent circumstances exception. Considering the issue under a de novo standard of review,143 the court briefly
reviewed the history of the exception before beginning its analysis.
Recognizing that warrants are generally required to enter an individual’s private property, the court noted the narrow circumstances in
which the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the exigent circumstances
exception, namely for purposes of pursuing a fleeing felon, preventing
destruction of evidence, searching after a lawful arrest, and fighting
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Riggs (Riggs I), 890 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Id. at 467-68.
Riggs II, 918 So. 2d at 278.
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fires.144 The court followed this by summarizing Florida’s own application of the exigent circumstances exception, stating that “where safety
is threatened and time is of the essence, we have recognized that ‘the
need to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury provides justification for an otherwise invalid entry.’ ”145 The exigent circumstance
presented by both Eason and Riggs I was a “feared medical emergency.”146 Although not one of the named U.S. Supreme Court exceptions above, the Florida Supreme Court discussed Supreme Court
dicta that gave a clear indication the Court would approve of a warrantless entry in response to the belief of a need for immediate medical
assistance.147 The court proceeded to note its own precedent, which has
explicitly addressed and upheld warrantless entries based upon feared
medical emergencies, although such cases did not involve a lost child
in an apartment complex.148 In situations of a feared medical emergency, “the sanctity of human life becomes more important than the
sanctity of the home.”149 Finally, the court applied the exception to the
circumstances leading up to Riggs’ arrest.
Riggs argued the warrantless entry was unreasonable for two reasons: (1) “the deputies lacked a sufficient objective basis for fearing a
medical emergency,” and (2) there was no basis to link any potential
emergency with his apartment.150 Dispelling the first contention, the
court opined that because the girl was only four years old, was alone
outside in the middle of the night, and was not wearing any clothes,
sufficient evidence existed to infer that there was “grossly negligent
supervision or an emergency involving the child’s caretaker.”151 Regarding the second claim, the court conceded that the deputies lacked
certainty the girl came from Riggs’ apartment, but pointed out that
certainty is not required when acting upon fear of a medical emergency.152 In accordance with the text of the Fourth Amendment, the
requirement is that “the police reasonably believe that an emergency
exists.”153 Based on the child’s proximity to the particular apartment
complex, the fact of light coming from an open door at three o’clock in
the morning, and the lack of response to repeated knocks, the court
believed the deputies were justified in their belief of a feared medical

144. Id.
145. Id. at 279 (quoting Arango v. State, 411 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1982)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 280 (discussing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) and Thompson v.
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984)).
148. Id. at 280-81 (discussing Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2003), Turner
v. State, 645 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1994), and Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971)).
149. Id. at 281.
150. Id. at 282.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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emergency.154 Thus, the court held that the sheriff’s deputies acted
“reasonably and consistent with the Fourth Amendment,” and the
trial court erred in suppressing the evidence.155
In Riggs II, the court found that the circumstances with which the
officers were faced, when taken as a whole, led to a reasonable inference that a medical emergency existed. Arguably, however, other inferences were available. As the court suggested itself, possibly the
situation was one of negligent supervision,156 in which case one could
argue warrantless entry was not at all necessary but instead child
services should have been contacted and the child taken into custody.
Possibly the child was able to open the door to the apartment and
leave on her own and did so while her caretaker(s) was sleeping.
Maybe the child was merely left in the parking lot, abandoned by a
parent, and had no link at all to any of the apartments. In spite of
the fact that the apartment entered here had its door open and a
light on, the fact that the apartment complex where the deputies
searched “contained as many as fifty apartments”157 reduced the likelihood that the wandering child was linked to any one even if the
child did live there. Therefore, although the inference made by the
deputies was legitimately one reasonable inference, the fact that
other reasonable inferences existed may detract from the strength of
that inference. The court failed to delineate in its opinion how strong
a reasonable inference must be to justify a warrantless entry.
Clearly, there is a significant conflict between the strong, albeit
rebuttable, presumption that a warrant is needed to enter an individual’s private property158 and the requirement of a reasonable belief of a need for immediate medical assistance to get around that
presumption. Given that protecting the privacy of the home is arguably the main purpose behind the wording of the Fourth Amendment,159 it is questionable that a reasonable inference that a medical
emergency exists, when numerous other reasonable inferences also
exist, is strong enough to justify a warrantless search. The court in
Riggs II did not provide guidance regarding whether the existence of
multiple reasonable inferences, some of which would not justify a
warrantless entry, would prevent any one on its own from justifying
such an entry. A lack of guidance regarding the strength of the reasonable inference could arguably lead to a slippery slope and the expansion of a doctrine which itself is supposed to be very narrow.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 283.
156. Id. at 282.
157. Id. at 276.
158. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177, 191 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
159. See supra text accompanying note 111.

2006]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1245

As Chief Judge Smith addressed in his dissent in Eason, “the police
have ‘complex and multiple tasks to perform’ ”160 besides the responsibility of identifying and dealing with those who have violated the
law.161 For example, they are relied on to bring assistance to those
threatened with physical harm, resolve conflict, and establish a sense
of security in a community.162 In deciding whether the entry is reasonable based on the exigent circumstances exception, courts must look at
the totality of existing circumstances and base the analysis of reasonableness on that with which the officer was faced.163 Although a homeowner might believe the only reasonable belief that could justify entry
of a home would be near certainty of an emergency, assessing reasonableness from a homeowner’s perspective fails to take account for the
multiple roles of police officers, their work experience, and the speed
with which they must often make the decision to enter private property or postpone an entry to get a warrant. Failing to give officers latitude and deference in making such decisions could arguably hinder an
officer’s ability to act according to his belief of what is necessary, and it
could ultimately work against the interests of those whom he is trying
to protect. Therefore, while the failure of the court to lay out more specific guidelines regarding what constitutes a reasonable belief has the
drawback of exposing the exception to overreaching, it is advantageous
in that it respects the domain of police officers and their need to act
according to the varying demands that arise from their numerous and
varied responsibilities.
As quoted in Riggs II, the U.S. Supreme Court has said, “Absent
some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a
magistrate between the citizen and the police. . . . It was done so that
an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.”164 An additional question thus raised by this
case is whether the scrutiny applied to a warrantless entry differs
between situations where a police officer is entering for a law enforcement purpose and situations where an officer enters for a nonlaw enforcement purpose, such as the feared medical emergency circumstance at issue in Riggs II. In the former situation, there is arguably a greater possibility and desire on the part of police officers to
find evidence that may prove guilt of a crime, for which the consequences to the individual whose privacy was invaded may be severe.
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in United States v. United States Dis-

160. Eason v. State, 546 So. 2d 57, 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (Smith, C.J., dissenting) (citing LAFAVE, supra note 130, § 6.6).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 60-61.
164. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1918) (emphasis added).
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trict Court,165 “[Executive officers] charged with this investigative
and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. . . . Unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.”166 Exigent circumstances related to
feared medical emergencies can be distinguished. Although invasions
of privacy are always a concern, when dealing with non-law enforcement exigent circumstances, the officers generally lack intent to
gather evidence or make an arrest, as they are entering for the purposes of providing what they believe will be needed emergency services. Thus, it is possible a court will be more lenient in its review of
such cases because the intent behind the search and the circumstances leading to the search do not generally pose the same risks to
the individual. In Hornblower v. State,167 the Florida Supreme Court
addressed this aspect of the exception when it stated, “the ‘emergency exception’ permits police to enter and investigate private
premises to preserve life, property, or render first aid, provided they
do not enter with an accompanying intent either to arrest or
search.”168 It is unclear how the presence of a law enforcement objective along with a feared medical emergency would alter the analysis.
Ultimately, the justification for a law enforcement-based or non-law
enforcement-based warrantless entry will probably hinge on whether
the court views that “the need to act expeditiously is essential.”169
If the court’s ruling in Riggs II finds further conflict in lower courts,
a future possibility is to modify the ruling by adopting an approach
taken in other jurisdictions. Some federal courts have explicitly labeled the feared medical emergency as a variant of the exigent circumstances exception, calling it the emergency aid exception.170 And some
of these courts have set out more detailed parameters for when a warrantless search falls within the exception. An example of such a test is
found in Bloom v. City of Scottsdale,171 an unpublished opinion from
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Bloom, the court set out three
factors which determine whether the exception is triggered:
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there
is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assis165. 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. 351 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1977).
168. Id. at 718 (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. See New Jersey v. Frankel, 847 A.2d 561 (N.J. 2004); see also Joseph L. Hubbard
Jr., Comment, Expanding the Emergency Aid Doctrine in State v. Frankel: Warrantless
Seizure of Privacy Interests or Justifiable Assurances of Protection?, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
213, 216-22 (2004).
171. No. 91-15472, 1992 WL 258883 (9th Cir.).
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tance for the protection of life or property. (2) The search must not
be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3)
There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable
cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be
searched.172

The first factor was explicitly addressed by the court in Riggs II,
the second seems to have been implicitly considered (and was mentioned when discussing court precedent), but it is not clear if the
Florida Supreme Court did (or would) require a finding of near probable cause to associate the emergency with the place to be searched
in order to justify the warrantless entry.
Hypothetically, one may wonder how Riggs II might affect a missing adult person’s case. For example, assume an individual called the
police station to report a female friend who had been missing for several days from work. This missing person failed to call in but is
known to call in on the rare occasions she will be out; there was no
answer at the woman’s door when her friend went to visit, although
her car is sitting outside; the trash can is sitting by the road, when
the trash was picked up several days before; and the woman has not
answered her home or cell phone or returned calls in several days.
Would a warrantless entry be justified under the exigent circumstances exception? It is not clear from the Riggs II opinion. Arguably,
one can reasonably infer from such facts that the woman may have
suffered from some kind of emergency and be in need of assistance
but unable to request it. But there are numerous other explanations
why the woman might be temporarily unreachable for several days,
including reasons that have nothing to do with a need for emergency
assistance. And even if the woman is in need of assistance, it is unknown whether the inferences link up strongly enough with her
house, justifying immediate warrantless entry. Additionally, if the
woman has already been missing for several days, a slightly longer
delay to obtain a warrant may not make a difference.
In United States District Court, the Supreme Court stated that
one of its primary functions in resolving the case was “to examine
and balance the basic values at stake in this case: the duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger
posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free
expression.”173 In Riggs II, the Florida Supreme Court similarly had
to balance competing interests. There, the competing interests were
the duty of police officers to provide aid combined with the expectation of the public to receive aid in emergency situations and the pri172. Id. at *3-4 (citing Arizona v. Fisher, 686 P.2d 750, 760 (Ariz. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1066 (1984)).
173. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972).
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vacy interests and property rights of individuals. The ripple effects of
the court’s opinion remain to be seen, but in the specific circumstances of Riggs II, the court decided that “[the] resulting invasion of
privacy is one that prudent, law-abiding citizens can accept as the
fair and necessary price of having the police available as a safety net
in emergencies.”174 Although the opinion in Riggs II was brief,
straightforward, and unanimous, this Note shows the underlying
complexity of the issue and the possible complications that may flow
from its resolution.
TAXATION—EXEMPTIONS FOR MUNICIPALLY OWNED PROPERTY—
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT STATUTES IMPOSING AD
VALOREM TAXES ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES OWNED BY A
MUNICIPALITY ARE NOT FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL—Florida Department of Revenue v. City of Gainesville (Revenue II), 918 So. 2d
250 (Fla. 2005).
Florida Department of Revenue v. City of Gainesville (Revenue II),175
recently decided by the Florida Supreme Court, involved a challenge
by the City of Gainesville (“City”) against state statutory provisions
that mandated municipalities pay ad valorem taxes on property owned
and used by the municipalities to provide telecommunications services.176 The City made a facial challenge to the relevant provisions,
claiming the obligatory tax was unconstitutional under article VII,
section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution.177 Article VII, section 3(a) provides an exemption from taxation for “property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes.”178 In
this case, the focus of the court’s analysis “hinge[d] on whether providing two-way telecommunications services to the public always serves
‘municipal or public purposes.’ ”179 Holding six to one that that ad
valorem taxation of a municipality’s telecommunications services is
not facially unconstitutional, the court reversed the First District
Court and remanded with directions to reverse the summary judgment
granted to the City by the trial court.180 The court emphasized its determination was narrow, concluding merely that “a municipality does
not as a matter of law engage in an activity essential to the welfare of
the community” in providing telecommunication services.181 Given the
high standard that must be met to find a statute facially unconstitu174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Riggs v. State (Riggs II), 918 So. 2d 274, 282-83 (Fla. 2005).
918 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 255.
FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a).
Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 256.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 253.
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tional, the majority opinion in one sense is not surprising. However, as
pointed out by the dissent and lower courts, the majority opinion is
somewhat disconcerting because it appears to alter the longstanding
state definition of “municipal purpose” and makes questionable
whether other municipal services will be able to withstand challenges
to their tax-exempt status.
Local governments in Florida receive their primary source of revenue through ad valorem taxes levied on real property and tangible
personal property; therefore, critical tax dollars are lost when government-owned property is incorrectly classified as exempt.182 In Florida,
the total value of government-exempt property owned by municipalities totaled approximately $58.5 billion in 2004.183 Ad valorem means
literally “according to the value,”184 and this type of tax has two parts.
The first component is the rate at which the tax will be imposed, and
the second element is the assessed value of the taxable property, generally determined by a property appraiser.185 Multiplying these two
values provides the amount of tax that will be imposed.186
In 1995, the Florida legislature enacted legislation enabling governmental entities to sell two-way telecommunication services to the
public.187 Two years later, the ability of government entities to exercise
that right became contingent upon the payment of ad valorem taxes or
equivalent fees, which was set out in section 2 of chapter 97-197, Laws
of Florida, and which created section 166.047, Telecommunications
Services, Florida Statutes (1997).188 In order for a municipality to receive or hold a certificate from the Public Service Commission to operate a telecommunications facility and in order for such services to satisfy the public purpose requirement under article VIII, section 2(b) of
the Florida Constitution (which establishes municipal authority),189
the municipality is required to pay ad valorem taxes on such a facility.
In addition, the 1997 legislation amended a prior statute to establish
that a municipality providing two-way telecommunications services to
182. David M. Hudson, Governmental Immunity and Taxation in Florida, 9 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221, 228 (1998).
183. State of Florida Department of Revenue, Assessed Values of Real, Personal, and
Railroad Property by Municipality for 2004 and 2003, 74, available at http://
www.myflorida.com/dor/property/databk.html (follow “2004 Assessment Data by Municipality” hyperlink under “Top Data Book Requests”).
184. 71 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 18 (2005).
185. Hudson, supra note 182, at 228.
186. Id.
187. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville (Revenue II), 918 So. 2d 250, 253 (Fla.
2005) (citing FLA. STAT. § 364.02(12) (1995)).
188. Id.
189. “Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise
provided by law. Each municipal legislative body shall be elective.” FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §
2(b).
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the public does not constitute an exempt use for ad valorem tax purposes as set out in section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995).190 In
sum, “[t]he purpose and effect of this legislation is to make property
owned and used by a municipality for a telecommunications business
subject to ad valorem property taxation.”191
Operating under the fictitious name of Gainesville Regional Utilities, the City obtained certificates to operate as a public telecommunications provider and sold telecommunications infrastructure and integrated telecommunications services to the public.192 Due to the legislative changes above, the City was subject to ad valorem taxation on
property providing these services. The City filed suit in 2000, contending the two portions of the recent law directly conflicted with article
VII, section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution, which gives municipalities
certain exemptions from ad valorem taxation and states in pertinent
part: “All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it
for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation.”193 The
trial court agreed with the City, granting summary judgment and
finding the sections facially unconstitutional; the First District affirmed, with a dissent from Judge Ervin.194 Maintaining its position on
the appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the City contended a facial
violation existed because the relevant provisions made property that
was used for municipal or public purposes taxable, which is expressly
prohibited in the Florida Constitution.195 The Department of Revenue
(“Department”) based its argument on Judge Ervin’s dissent and argued for “a narrower construction of the ‘municipal or public purposes’
that would exclude a municipality’s telecommunications business that
competes with the private sector for customers.”196
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, recognizing that in order to find a statute facially unconstitutional, there
must be “no set of circumstances . . . under which the statute would
be valid.”197 As mentioned previously, the crux of the court’s analysis
was on whether the two-way telecommunications services always
satisfy “municipal or public purposes,” so that the property would
qualify for the exemption from ad valorem taxation set out in article
VII, section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution.198 Because “municipal or
190. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 254 (noting that certain exceptions existed but were not
applicable to this case); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville (Revenue I), 859 So. 2d
595, 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
191. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 254.
192. Id.
193. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a) (emphasis added); see also Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 255.
194. Id. at 255.
195. Answer Brief for Appellee at 7, Revenue II, No. SC03-2273.
196. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d. at 256.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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public purposes” is not defined in article VII, section 3(a), the court
first had to establish a definition and then proceed to determine
whether telecommunications services fell within it.199
In establishing the definition, the court first looked to how the
term “municipal purpose” was construed under the Florida Constitution of 1885, in order to give historical perspective and context to article VII, section 3(a), which was adopted in the 1968 revision to the
Florida Constitution.200 The 1885 Constitution provided two provisions for tax exemptions for property used for municipal purposes,
both of which the court found to be non-self-executing.201 The court
explained that under those provisions it “deferred to the Legislature’s authorization of municipal functions and clear intention to exempt property used therefore from ad valorem taxation.”202 Additionally, the court held that competition with the private sector did not
automatically prevent a municipal purpose from being exempt “if the
Legislature determined that the activity was essential to the welfare
of the municipality.”203
The 1968 revision to the Florida Constitution led to the current
article VII, section 3(a), which provides the exemption from ad valorem taxation for property used for “municipal or public purposes.”204
In contrast to the provisions from the 1885 Constitution, the court
explained article VII, section 3(a) is self-executing and does not require that the legislature declare an activity meets a municipal purpose to qualify for the tax exemption.205 Furthermore, the 1968 revision requires that exempt property be used by the municipality that
owns it, whereas a provision in the 1885 Constitution did not mandate ownership and use by the municipality as long as other conditions were met.206 After examining the history of the revision and
relevant case law, the court concluded that separate tests applied
when dealing with private interests in municipally owned property
and when dealing with property both owned and used solely by the
municipality.207 In the latter, which is relevant to the City’s case, the
question is “whether ‘municipal or public purposes’ under article VII,
section 3(a) of the 1968 Constitution is as broad as ‘municipal purposes’ under the corresponding provisions of the 1885 Constitution”

199. Id.
200. Id. at 257-59.
201. Id. at 258.
202. Id. at 259.
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Id. The addition of public purposes is irrelevant, as the Florida Supreme Court previously held that “public purposes” and “municipal purposes” were synonymous. Id. at 261.
205. Id. at 259.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 259-61.
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as interpreted in court precedent.208 Answering this, the court stated
that the framers of article VII, section 3(a) did not intend to narrow
the definition of municipal purposes from its previous interpretation;
they merely wanted to require both ownership and exclusive use of
property by the municipality.209 This was a legislative response to a
1965 case holding that municipal property leased to a corporation
qualified under the old provision.210
The Florida Supreme Court next looked to the interpretation of
“municipal purposes” under article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida
Constitution, because the City argued that “municipal or public purposes” under the tax exemption provision should receive the same
construction.211 In examining precedent dealing with article VIII, section 2(b), the court explained it had recognized under that provision
“the broad sweep of municipalities’ inherent power”212 and the absence of any required authorization from the legislature to exercise
its authority.213 But the court refused to apply the same construction
to “municipal or public purposes” under article VII, section 3(a) for
the purposes of an ad valorem tax exemption. Because the definition
of “municipal purposes” as interpreted under article VIII, section 2(b)
had been “imprecise”214 and because that provision and article VII,
section 3(a) “serve different functions,”215 the court expressly distinguished precedent interpreting what constitutes a municipal purpose
under each.216 In essence, an activity could satisfy the requirement
for “municipal purposes” under article VIII, section 2(b) but not satisfy the requirement for “municipal or public purposes” under article
VII, section 3(a), thus leaving it subject to ad valorem taxation.
Basing its definition on how “municipal or public purposes” was
interpreted by the court in prior decisions dealing with the constitutional tax exemption, the court concluded the term “encompass[es]
activities that are essential to the health, morals, safety, and general
welfare of the people within the municipality.”217 In applying this
definition to the challenged provisions, the court could not say that it
was unconstitutional on its face. Although the stated goals of opening
telecommunications services to competition were to “provide customers with freedom of choice, encourage the introduction of new tele208. Id. at 261.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 259-61; see also Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v.
Paul, 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965).
211. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 261-62.
212. Id. at 262.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 263.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 262-63.
217. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
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communications service, encourage technological innovation, and encourage investment in telecommunications infrastructure,”218 the
court stated that the law enables municipalities to provide such services irrespective of whether the service promotes any of the goals.219
Thus, since it is possible a municipal telecommunications service
would fail to promote the stated aims of section 365.01(3), Florida
Statutes, such property would not be exempt from ad valorem taxation because it would fail to serve a “municipal or public purpose.”220
Therefore, the court held that the challenged legislation was not unconstitutional on its face, rendering no opinion on how it would be
viewed as applied.221
Justice Anstead wrote a dissent, in which he disagreed with the
narrow construction of “municipal purpose.” Although the majority
stated the definition includes only those activities that are “essential
to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the people within
the municipality,”222 Justice Anstead argued that “this definition appears both arbitrary and without support from our case law, and it
represents an unprecedented challenge to the broad discretion and authority of local government and home rule traditionally favored in
Florida.”223 He cited largely to Chief Judge Wolf’s opinion for the First
District Court of Appeal, which set out the Florida Supreme Court’s
line of decisions that broadly interpret “municipal purpose.”224 He further opined that the majority ruling threatens the very purpose of the
tax exemption—to encourage municipalities to use property owned by
them to serve their citizens.225 Anstead also stressed that the 1968 revision to the Florida Constitution was made merely to prevent private
parties benefiting from the tax exemption, not to alter the exemption
as applied to the municipality itself.226 Because of this, Justice Anstead
argued that the court should not have altered the meaning of “municipal purposes” as applied to property owned and used by a municipality
to serve its citizens from how it was construed prior to the 1968 revision.227 Additionally, Justice Anstead questioned the ability of other
public services, such as parks, pools, and zoos, to maintain their taxexempt status based on the majority ruling.228 Finally, even using the
majority’s definition of “municipal or public services,” Justice Anstead
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

FLA. STAT. § 364.01(3) (2004).
Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 265.
Id.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 266 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
Id. at 266-67.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 270.
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argued that telecommunications services meet the requirement that
the services are essential, providing one more reason for finding the
legislation unconstitutional.229
Two aspects of the majority opinion are somewhat confusing and
arguably inconsistent. To begin with, as Justice Anstead pointed out
in his dissent, the majority’s use of precedent for narrowly construing
“municipal purpose” is contradicted by language in the cases it uses
to support such an assertion.230 The majority cited State ex rel.
Harper v. McDavid231 to explain how the court interpreted “municipal
purposes” regarding tax exemption cases in the past.232 That case involved a challenge to legislatively authorized ad valorem tax exemption for municipalities establishing and operating low-rent housing
units.233 There, the court opined:
What constituted a municipal purpose is a legislative question that
should not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of a
clear abuse of discretion. . . . [T]he time was when municipal purpose was restricted to police protection or such enterprises as were
strictly governmental, but that concept has been very much expanded . . . .234

Although McDavid used the terminology “essential to the health,
morals, protection, and welfare of the municipality,” the court cited
to another case that listed golf courses and office buildings among a
sample list showing what types of city projects would constitute a
“municipal purpose.”235
Based on the above description and the examples provided, it
seems there is an inconsistency between the majority’s assertion that
it would construe “municipal or public purposes” under article VII,
section 3(a) in accordance with “the definition utilized by the Court
in its prior decisions on the constitutional tax exemption”236 and that
it would construe municipal purposes as activities that are “essential,” encompassing “the concept of great need or necessity.”237 In
Saunders v. City of Jacksonville,238 the court deferred to a legislative
decision exempting from ad valorem taxation property owned by a
municipality’s public utility that provided services in a different

229. Id. at 272-73.
230. Id. at 266-70.
231. 200 So. 100 (Fla. 1941).
232. See Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 264.
233. McDavid, 200 So. at 101.
234. Id. at 102.
235. Id. (citing State v. City of Tallahassee, 195 So. 402 (Fla. 1940)); Revenue II, 918
So. 2d at 270 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
236. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 263 (majority opinion).
237. Id. at 264.
238. 25 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1946).
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county.239 The court stated specifically that although the act might
enable the city to compete with private utilities that must pay taxes
that was not enough to declare it invalid.240 Likewise, in Revenue II,
the majority stated that governmental-propriety activities are not
necessarily outside the bounds of what constitutes “municipal or public purposes.”241 When a government has a proprietary function, however, it seems difficult to reconcile the service provided with the notion of “essential” as the majority claims to define it. Although numerous types of services may be needed in a general sense, if a government is competing with private service providers, whether it is
truly “necessary or indispensable”242 that the municipality provide
the same service becomes more tenuous.
The majority in Revenue II also cited City of Sarasota v. Mikos243
as another case conveying its interpretation of “municipal or public
purpose.” There, the court held that “vacant land held by a municipality is presumed to be in use for a public purpose if it is not actually in use for a private purpose on tax assessment day.”244 Although
the land was not being used at all, but was merely being held for alleged future public uses, the court deferred to the legislative determination that it was being held for future public needs and, thus, it
constituted a municipal purpose and was exempt from ad valorem
taxation.245 Again, as Justice Anstead highlighted, it is difficult to see
the broad interpretation of “municipal or public purposes” in that
case as aligning with the alleged “basic, necessary, or indispensable”
requirement set out by the majority.246 Because precedent suggests a
more lenient and broad construction of “municipal or public purposes,” it seems the majority did not adhere to its asserted position
that it would continue to interpret the term in accordance with past
history; the majority in reality seems to have narrowed the definition
in Revenue II.
The Department relied heavily on Sebring Authority v. McIntyre247 in
arguing for a narrower construction of “municipal or public purposes.”248
Based on that case and Williams v. Jones,249 the Department further contended that the “governmental-governmental/governmental-proprietary

239. Id. at 650-51.
240. Id. at 650.
241. See Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 259.
242. See id. at 264 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 396 (10th
ed. 1999)).
243. 374 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979).
244. Id. at 460.
245. See id. at 459-61.
246. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 270 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
247. 783 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2001).
248. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 1-3, Revenue II, Case No. SC 03-2273 (Fla. 2005).
249. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975).
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standard” should be applied to the statutes being challenged here.250 Under that test, “article VII, section 3(a) does not permit municipal property
leased to private entities for governmental-proprietary activities to be tax
exempt,”251 proprietary activities being those generally operated for profit.
However, as the First District pointed out, that case and others put forth
to support a narrower construction “involve situations where municipal
property is being leased or utilized by a private entity”252 and not as to
municipal property owned and used by the municipality itself. The Florida Supreme Court explicitly noted a clear distinction between the two
scenarios, concluding that “the ‘governmental-governmental test’ governs eligibility for the constitutional tax exemption in article VII, section
3(a)”253 and “was never intended to apply to property both owned and
used exclusively by a municipality.”254 Although the court said it would
not apply that test to the statutes regarding telecommunications services, the court ultimately agreed with the Department on the resolution of the issue.
The majority pointed out that telecommunications services differed from other services that precedent categorized as falling under
the scope of “municipal or public purposes,” such as electrical power
and public parks, in that telecommunications services were not provided by the public sector throughout history.255 However, it is not
entirely clear why that distinction matters given that (a) the court
said a municipal purpose could be served despite the fact that the activity competed with the private sector, and (b) the focus is on the
whether the service is essential rather than how it has historically
been provided.256
Ultimately, the court stated that because a municipality could enter the market without furthering the goals stated under section
364.01(3), which laid out the legislature’s reasoning behind allowing
municipalities to enter the telecommunications market to begin with,
it was possible a municipality would not provide a service essential to
the health, morals, safety and general welfare of its citizens.257 Again,
it is not entirely clear why providing telecommunications services,
even if it furthers one of the three listed goals of introducing new levels of service, fostering innovation, or encouraging infrastructure investment, automatically means the service does not serve a “municipal or public purpose.”
250. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3-12, supra note 248.
251. McIntyre, 783 So. 2d at 248.
252. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville (Revenue I), 859 So. 2d 595, 599 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2003).
253. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 260.
254. Id. at 261.
255. Id. at 265.
256. See Revenue I, 859 So. 2d at 601.
257. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 265.
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The standard that must be met to find a statute facially unconstitutional is very high—the court must find that there is no “set of circumstances under which the challenged enactment might be upheld.”258 Therefore, to a certain extent the decision is not entirely
surprising, irrespective of the ambiguities mentioned above. Whether
“municipal or public purpose” under article VII, section 3(a) is defined narrowly or broadly, it is not illogical for the court to conclude a
set of circumstances could exist where a municipality would provide
telecommunications services under circumstances where those services are neither “essential” nor even for the “comfort, convenience,
safety and happiness of the citizens.”259
Yet, Justice Anstead in his dissent argued plausibly that even following the majority’s narrower interpretation of “municipal or public
purpose” exemption from ad valorem taxation, these provisions still
satisfy the requirement.260 He noted the relevance of telecommunications services for the purposes of education, to broadcast warnings of
emergencies, and to enable citizens to call the police or fire department.261 Moreover, the First District pointed out that municipalities,
to enter the telecommunications market, are issued certificates from
the Public Service Commission, which in itself suggests the services
are for the welfare of citizens.262 Furthermore, as the trial court
noted, the absence of a municipal monopoly in this area is irrelevant
to the need for the services. Telecommunications, if anything, are
“more analogous to such services as electricity and water, long recognized as serving valid municipal and public purposes.”263 Thus, Justice Anstead contested the majority’s definition of “municipal or public purposes” and whether telecommunications fits within that definition if applied.
The outcome of this case could potentially increase litigation and
affect public policy. To begin with, the statutes survived in this case
under a facial challenge, with no opinion given regarding how an asapplied challenge would be decided. Any municipality wanting to
challenge ad valorem taxes placed on its telecommunications services
will therefore have to challenge it on the latter basis in hopes of pre-

258. Id.
259. Revenue I, 859 So. 2d at 599 (emphasis omitted) (citing Greater Orlando Aviation
Auth. v. Crotty, 775 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) and Page v. Ferandina Beach, 714 So.
2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)). This is a broader interpretation given to the term “municipal
or public purpose.”
260. See Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 271-73 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 272.
262. Revenue I, 859 So. 2d at 600 (stating that “the provision of telecommunications
services for the benefit of city residents constitutes a valid municipal purpose pursuant to
any reasonable interpretation of the term ‘municipal purpose.’ The best evidence in this
regard is the statute itself . . . .”).
263. Id. (citing the trial court opinion).
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venting the imposition of the taxes. Furthermore, the Florida legislature could, in theory, pass similar laws requiring ad valorem taxation
of other municipal services, such as parks, pools, and zoos, on the basis that it is possible under “some set of circumstances” that those
services also fail to serve a “municipal or public purpose.”264 Again, if
similar legislation to that challenged in Revenue I were passed respecting other services, an increase in as-applied challenges to such
laws could emerge. Moreover, although the court did not consider
public policy implications, as legitimately that was not the issue presented to it, the imposition of ad valorem taxes on property owned
and used by the municipality to provide services to its citizens could
make utility services more expensive to provide and may not “truly
‘level the playing field.’ ”265 In such cases, the statutes challenged in
Revenue II and any similarly passed legislation will serve as a disincentive for municipalities to provide services to its citizens.
Ultimately, it appears that the construction of “municipal or public purpose” with regards to tax exemption cases may be imprecise,
just as the court claimed the construction of “municipal purpose” is
under article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution.266 The majority, however, decided that the definition was not imprecise and
that it could construe a definition of “municipal or public purposes”
for the purposes of ad valorem tax exemption in article VII, section
3(a). Based on precedent, the majority concluded the phrase requires
that the government activity is “essential.” It then found that telecommunications services do not necessarily constitute essential services and rejected the facial challenge to the statutes at issue. As the
First District and the dissent noted, however, whether “municipal or
public purpose” requires that the government activity is essential is
debatable, and whether telecommunications services are essential if
such a definition is imposed is also debatable. The case leaves uncertain what government services will continue to constitute a “municipal or public purpose” in order to be exempt from ad valorem taxation and may affect municipal decisions dealing with the provision of
public services.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS STATE
AGENCIES ARE BOUND BY CONTROLLING JUDICIAL STATUTORY
INTERPRETATIONS—Costarell v. Florida Unemployment Appeals
Commission, 916 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 2005).
As a fundamental tenant of American jurisprudence, once a point
of law has been resolved by judicial decision, it is then binding upon
264. See Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 270-71 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
265. See Answer Brief for Appellee at 11, Revenue II, Case No. SC 03-2273 (Fla. 2005).
266. See supra text accompanying note 215.
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courts of lesser jurisdiction.267 Within Florida, a decision from any
district court of appeal is binding upon all Florida trial courts so long
as interdistrict conflict does not exist.268 In Costarell v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, the Florida Supreme Court made
clear that this framework extends into the field of administrative
practice, where state agencies are bound by statutory interpretations
by courts of the state.269
In Costarell, the issue before the court was whether the failure of
a claimant to file weekly claims once the claimant had been determined ineligible for benefits by the Florida Unemployment Appeals
Commission (“Commission”) precluded the claimant from receiving
benefits even upon successful appeal.270 The Third District Court of
Appeal (“Third District”) faced this same question on three previous
occasions and the court consistently ruled a claimant could not be
denied benefits upon successful appeal of an ineligibility ruling,271 because, as the Florida Supreme Court pointed out, a claimant “would
ordinarily and reasonably believe it would be a useless act to continue to file weekly claims.”272
The issue first came before the Third District in Savage v. Macy’s
East, Inc. (Savage I),273 where the court determined that the Commission had wrongfully held the claimant, Savage, did not qualify for
compensation.274 Following this decision, the Commission continued
to deny the claimant benefits based upon her failure to file weekly
claims following her ineligibility determination by the Commission
and during the subsequent appeal.275 The Third District then issued
another opinion in Savage v. Macy’s East, Inc. (Savage II),276 in response to Savage’s motion to enforce the Savage I court’s mandate in
which the court rejected the Commission’s claims regarding the
weekly filings and explained that the Commission “had no authority
to deviate” from the court’s prior ruling “directing that the claimant
receive benefits now that she had been determined to be properly eligible.”277 Again this issue came before the Third District in Dines v.
Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission,278 where the court held,

267. Wood v. Fraser, 677 So. 2d 15, 19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
268. Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992).
269. 916 So. 2d 778, 782 n.2 (Fla. 2005) (citing Mikolsky v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 721 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)).
270. Id. at 782 n.1.
271. See id. at 779-80.
272. Id. at 783.
273. 708 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
274. Costarell, 916 So. 2d at 779 (citing Savage I, 708 So. 2d at 689).
275. Id.
276. 719 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
277. Costarell, 916 So. 2d at 779-80.
278. 730 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
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as previously “said in dictum” in Savage II, “that the denial of benefits on this ground is entirely erroneous.”279
Despite the Third District’s Savage II and Dines rulings remaining the prevailing law, Mr. Costarell, like the claimants in both previous cases, had successfully appealed his declaration of ineligibility
only to be subsequently denied benefits by the Commission due to his
failure to file weekly claims after his denial and during the pendency
of his appeal.280 Mr. Costarell then filed a pro se appeal, and the Second District Court of Appeal (“Second District”) affirmed the Commission’s action.281 The case then came before the Florida Supreme
Court based upon certified conflict between the Second District’s ruling and the Third District’s holding in Dines.282
The question before the Supreme Court of Florida in Costarell was
whether weekly filings must be continued upon denial of benefits in
order to qualify for unemployment compensation once the claimant
was ultimately deemed eligible.283 The majority concluded that while
the plain language of the statute does require claimants file claims
weekly, the absence of a mandate to do so once a claimant has been
determined ineligible relieves the claimant of the continuing obligation.284 The court pragmatically reasoned that “without an express
statutory directive to do so,” an ineligible claimant would see no reason to continue filing claims following an adverse eligibility ruling.285
The dissenting opinion in Costarell instead relied upon the plain
language of the two relevant statutory provisions.286 According to the
text of one of these statutes at the time, unemployed individuals
were eligible for compensation only if a claim had been made with respect to the week.287 Furthermore, the second provision provided that
payment was contingent upon the claimant reporting at least biweekly.288 The dissent reasoned that in the absence of any estoppel
argument legally excusing Mr. Costarell’s noncompliance, he “failed
to meet these express, unambiguous statutory conditions for the receipt of UC benefits” for the weeks in question.289
Ultimately, the issue of weekly filings was decided by the legislature subsequent to the events that gave rise to this suit.290 In a 2003
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 379.
Costarell, 916 So. 2d at 781-82.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 779.
Id. at 782 n.1.
Id.at 782.
Id. at 783.
See id. at 783-84 (Bell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 783 (majority opinion).

2006]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1261

amendment, the legislature expressly provided that claimants are
required to continue filings while their appeals are pending.291
Although the differing views of the majority and dissent offer an
interesting look into the divergent judicial philosophies that currently make up the court, the most interesting aspect of this decision
came in the majority’s stinging rebuke of the Commission’s action in
this case, which the court presented as the Commission’s systemic
denial of justice to “claimants who are typically unrepresented by
counsel and are both unaware of and are not told of their rights under the law.”292
In its opinion quashing the Second District’s previous ruling in
Costarell and affirming Dines, the Florida Supreme Court reissued a
stern admonishment from the Third District in response to the Commission “ignor[ing] . . . the established law,” going so far as to suggest the matter may justify further action on the part of the legislature, state executive branch, or Secretary of Labor.293 The Florida
Supreme Court further pointed out that the Commission made no attempt to explain its failure to follow the established law, offering
only the same arguments put forth in previous cases, which this
court rejected as well.294 Finally, the court cautioned the Commission
“that it too is bound by the rule of law” and “express[ed] dismay” that
it “would show so little regard for the controlling holdings of an appellate court of the State of Florida.”295 So that such objectionable
conduct might not occur in the future, the court made perfectly clear
the Commission’s duty of deference:
An agency of this state, such as the Commission, must follow the
interpretations of statutes as interpreted by the courts of the state.
Like trial courts, if there is a controlling interpretation by a district court of appeal in this state, the Commission must follow it,
even if the court of appeal is located outside the district of the trial
court. If there is a conflict between interpretations by different
courts of appeal, that may provide a basis to reach the supreme
court for a final interpretation. Thereafter, the supreme court’s in-

291. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 443.091 (2005) (“[E]ach claimant must continue to report regardless of any appeal or pending appeal relating to her or his eligibility or disqualification for
benefits.”).
292. Costarell, 916 So. 2d at 780 (quoting Savage v. Macy’s East, Inc., 719 So. 2d 1208,
1210 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)).
293. Id. (quoting Savage, 719 So. 2d at 1210 n.2). The court goes on to provide a
lengthy string citation of cases from every district court of appeal in which the Commission
was reversed upon the issue of misconduct. Id.
294. Id. at 782.
295. Id.
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terpretation of the statute must prevail, barring future legislative
changes to the statute.296

Though both the majority and dissent offer an interesting discussion
of the statutory scheme relied upon by the Commission regarding
weekly filings,297 the implications of this case are mostly limited to its
administrative procedure aspects as the legislature has now settled
the issue of the necessity of weekly filings.
PROCEDURAL LAW—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT CREATES A BRIGHT-LINE
RULE THAT COURT ORDERS ENTERED TO RESOLVE GOOD FAITH
MOTIONS SHOULD AUTOMATICALLY BE TREATED AS ACTIVITY, THUS
PRECLUDING DISMISSAL—Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2005).
The danger of inconsistency arises when courts interpret rules of
procedure and statutes. Even when a court interprets a rule or statute so as to make it seem clear, another court may come along and
misinterpret the previous court’s decision. Whenever the plain meaning of a statute is unambiguous, it should be adhered to in order to
avoid inconsistency. The fewer subjective decisions a court has to
make, the less chance there is for prejudice. Wilson v. Salamon298 resolved a procedural issue, and the decision will greatly impact lawsuits because it will allow many more lawsuits to remain on the
docket that would have previously been dismissed.
The issue was whether court orders filed to resolve good faith motions are automatically treated as activity or whether a trial court
must continue to review its own orders to determine if they are passive.299 The Florida Supreme Court held that court orders filed to resolve good faith motions should automatically be treated as activity,
and the cases in which these orders are filed should not be dismissed.300 The court adopted this bright-line rule and abandoned past
precedent where an inquiry was made into whether the activity was
active and “calculated to hasten the suit to judgment,”301 or whether
it was passive and should be dismissed.
The facts of this case are that Ms. Wilson filed a negligence claim
on March 15, 2001, against Dr. Eva J. Salamon and Bond Clinic,
P.A., alleging that her daughter was injured at birth.302 The defendants filed an answer, and on June 25, 2001, Kenneth Levine, an attorney from Massachusetts, filed a motion to appear pro hac vice as
296. Id. at 782 n.2 (quoting Mikolsky v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 721 So. 2d
738, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)) (footnotes omitted).
297. FLA. STAT. § 443.091(1)(a) (2002).
298. 923 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2005).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 363-64.
301. Gulf Appliance Distribs., Inc. v. Long, 53 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 1951).
302. Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 364.
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co-counsel for Ms. Wilson; however, an order was never entered on
this motion.303 On October 29, 2001, the defendants objected to certain interrogatories and filed responses to requests for production.304
Then there was no activity in the case until Vivian Sparacio, the
partner of Mr. Levine filed a similar motion to appear pro hac vice as
co-counsel for Ms. Wilson, which was granted by an order filed on
April 4, 2002.305 After this there was no activity until the defendants
moved to dismiss the action on November 4, 2002.306
The Second District Court of Appeal (“Second District”) affirmed
the trial court’s decision to dismiss the action holding that a motion
to appear pro hac vice was not “activity” that would preclude dismissal under rule 1.420(e), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.307 The
Second District also certified the question to the Florida Supreme
Court as one of great public importance.308 In overturning the Second
District, the Florida Supreme Court held that all good faith trial
court orders filed to resolve motions should preclude dismissal, and
no inquiry should be made into whether the activity was active or
passive.309 In reaching its decision, the majority looked at the history
of rule 1.420(e) and determined to adhere to its plain meaning.310
Rule 1.420(e) was adopted in 1966 by the Florida Supreme Court:
All actions in which it does not affirmatively appear from some action taken by filing of pleadings, order of court or otherwise that
the same is being prosecuted for a period of one year shall be . . .
dismissed by the court on its own motion or on motion of any interested person . . . after notice to the parties; provided that actions so dismissed may be reinstated on motion for good cause,
such motion to be served by any party within one month after such
order of dismissal.311

This rule replaced a similar Florida statute.312 In 1976, the court
positively rephrased the rule and removed the term “affirmatively,”
replacing it with a condition that activity must appear “on the face of
the record” to preclude dismissal.313 The court said that it did this because judges were befuddled by what “affirmatively” meant and were

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
1967.
313.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363-64.
Id. at 369.
In re Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure 1967 Revision, 187 So. 2d 598, 624 (Fla. 1966).
The rule replaced section 45.19(1), Florida Statutes (1965), which was repealed in
In re The Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure, 339 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. 1976).
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making arbitrary judgments conflicting with the purpose of the
rule.314 The rule, as interpreted by the court reads:
In all actions in which it appears on the face of the record that no
activity by filing of pleadings, order of court, or otherwise has occurred for a period of 10 months . . . shall be dismissed by the court
on its own motion or on the motion of any interested person . . . after reasonable notice to the parties, unless a party shows good
cause in writing at least 5 days before the hearing on the motion
why the action should remain pending. Mere inaction for a period
of less than 1 year shall not be sufficient cause for dismissal for
failure to prosecute.315

The majority indicated that the court’s 1951 opinion, in which the
old statute was interpreted, is to blame for the confusion.316 In Gulf
Appliance Distributors, Inc. v. Long, the court held that an order allowing for the withdrawal and substitution of counsel was not sufficient activity to preclude dismissal under section 45.19(1), Florida
Statutes.317 The Gulf Appliance court attempted to define “affirmatively” when it stated that the requirement meant “some active
measure taken by [the] plaintiff, intended and calculated to hasten
the suit to judgment.”318 The court in Wilson held that Gulf Appliance
should no longer be the standard because that case was decided
based on the old rule and the court has since taken out the term “affirmatively” from the rule.319 The court reasoned that it is a simple
question of interpreting the plain meaning of rule 1.420(e), but lower
courts have continued to be influenced by Gulf Appliance.320 The majority urged that where courts have not been adhering to the purpose
of the statute, stare decisis need not be followed.321 The court indicated that the meaning of current rule 1.420(e) was properly construed in Metropolitan Dade County v. Hall, where Justice Wells
noted that the rule only requires a simple review of the record to determine whether “[t]here is either activity on the face of the record or
there is not.”322
The majority justified its decision by balancing competing policy
issues. The court’s first and foremost concern, as provided in the
314. Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 365.
315. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.420(e).
316. Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 365.
317. Gulf Appliance Distribs., Inc. v. Long, 53 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 1951).
318. Id. at 707 (citing Argusta Sugar Co. v. Haley, 112 So. 731, 732 (La. 1927)).
319. Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 365.
320. Id. at 366 (citing Moossun v. Orlando Reg’l Health Care, 826 So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla.
2002)).
321. Id. at 367 (“Although stare decisis is fundamentally important in our system of
justice, it is not ‘an ironclad and unwavering rule’ so that we must bend to the ‘voice of the
past, however outmoded or meaningless that voice may have become.’ ”) (citing Weiand v.
State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1055 n.12 (Fla. 1999)).
322. 784 So. 2d 1087, 1090 (Fla. 2001).
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Florida Constitution, is to “be open to every person for redress of any
injury”323 and to resolve cases on the merits.324 The second, and lesser
concern, which is addressed by rule 1.420(e), is that cases filed and
left inactive will be weeded out so as not to hinder the first objective.325 The majority felt it had created a clear, bright-line test for
courts by allowing judges to simply dismiss “cases in which no record
activity took place within a year” rather than having to guess
whether an order is passive or active.326 The majority also stated that
it balanced the two policy issues by allowing a good faith showing as
to why the case should not be dismissed for inactivity.327 The majority
held that the order in Wilson, which granted the second motion to
appear pro hac vice, appeared on the face of the record, and so dismissal of the case per rule 1.420(e) was not proper.328
Justice Pariente concurred and concluded that “increased attention to judicial case management and less emphasis on arbitrary application of rule 1.420(e) better serves the administration of justice
and the goal of deciding cases on the merits.”329 Justice Pariente
noted that rule 1.420(e) is not as critical a tool for managing the
docket as it used to be because of several other rules of court that
have recently put more emphasis on judicial case management.330
Justice Pariente expressed confidence that judges have adequate
tools to manage their cases and argued that the majority’s construction of rule 1.420(e) will allow judges to focus on what Justice Pariente believes is most important issue—that is, “what the parties are
doing to bring the case to resolution.”331
Justice Bell concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed
with the majority that a bright-line test is appropriate for pleadings or
orders of the court, but he indicated that trial judges should still have
discretion for the “or otherwise” language in the rule.332 Justice Bell
agreed with Justice Wells in the dissent that abiding by the rule for
anything besides a pleading or order of the court “will have bad and
unfair consequences for many who are subjected to lawsuits that are
not fairly and with due diligence progressed to final judgment.”333 Jus-

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 367-68.
Id. at 368.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 369.
Id. (Pariente, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 371 (Bell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
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tice Bell indicated that rule 1.420(e) should be interpreted on a caseby-case basis and that any error made by the judge can be remedied.334
Justice Wells dissented based on his belief that the majority’s
bright-line rule will have “bad and unfair consequences” for people
dragged into lawsuits that are not pursued in a timely manner.335 Justice Wells stated that the ad hoc motion in this case should not have
been considered “activity” because it did nothing to advance the case
towards a resolution.336 Justice Wells argued that the two-step test
laid out in Del Duca v. Anthony337 was interpreted correctly by the
Second District in Metropolitan Dade County v. Hall.338 The test from
Del Duca is (1) whether there has been recorded activity for the year
preceding the motion; and (2) if there has been no record, the plaintiff
can establish good cause why the action should not be dismissed.339
The Second District interpreted Metropolitan Dade County v. Hall as
holding that the first step only requires the court to look at whether
there was activity, not to analyze whether that activity was passive or
active.340 Justice Wells cited this interpretation of Hall as incorrect
and found the interpretation of Hall in Sheen v. Time Inc. Magazine
Co.341 correct.342 In Sheen, the court concluded that the first part of the
test in Del Duca, if there is some sort of activity, involves deciding
whether the activity “constitutes sufficient record activity to preclude
dismissal under rule 1.420(e).”343 The court in Sheen held that Hall
only dealt with the second step of the Del Duca test—the good cause
analysis—and that the court “has not receded from Del Duca, which
teaches that discovery activity filed of record does not always qualify
as sufficient record activity for purposes of rule 1.420(e).”344
Justice Wells contended that the majority’s bright-line test will
lead to results for defendants that are “akin to slow-drip water torture.”345 He reasoned that if any activity qualifies as activity that
precludes dismissal under 1.420(e), the defendant will be unduly
burdened with a stagnant lawsuit that can put his life on hold for a
long time.346 Justice Wells rejected the argument that the defendant
can take on the task of moving the case for trial because it would impose on the defendant the burden of paying “substantial and over334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Id.
Id. (Wells, J., dissenting).
Id.
587 So. 2d 1306, 1308-09 (Fla. 1991).
Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 371-72.
Id. at 372 (citing Del Duca, 587 So. 2d at 1308-09).
Id.
817 So. 2d 974, 976-78 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 372.
Sheen, 817 So. 2d at 977.
Id. at 978 n.4.
Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 373.
Id. at 374.
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whelming expenses . . . to end a process that [he] did not initiate”;
and it is, fundamentally, the plaintiff’s responsibility to bring the
claim forward.347 Justice Wells stated that if a defendant moves for
trial, he will be prejudiced by the jury in a case that the plaintiff has
not pursued.348 Also, Justice Wells expressed his belief that the new
bright-line rule will allow plaintiffs to abuse the system and extend
cases indefinitely, which will prejudice the defense because of witnesses whose memories fade or who move away.349 Justice Wells
would have relied on the court’s prior precedent that “required . . .
the party bringing a claim to take some type of activity . . . which can
be considered as designed in good faith to prosecute the case . . . to an
ultimate conclusion.”350 Justice Wells admitted that there are some
problems with the precedent of the court and suggested that amending the current rule was the best way to solve these problems.351 He
suggested adopting a rule that would provide a bright-line test but
with a shorter time limit that would encourage parties who bring
claims to be efficient.352
The issue of how to interpret rule 1.420(e) has plagued Florida
courts for years, and the bright-line test created by the majority will
help to alleviate this uncertainty and put the focus of these cases
back on the merits. In Moossun v. Orlando Regional Health Care,353
the Florida Supreme Court tried to answer the question of what constituted activity that would preclude dismissal under rule 1.420(e).354
In that case, the court arbitrarily held that a case management conference ordered by the judge did not constitute record activity, and
the case was dismissed.355 In reaching its decision, the court disapproved of two lower court cases that had held that case management
conferences were record activity.356 In the dissent, Justice Lewis
made a good point that courts have held lesser “record activity” as
sufficient to preclude dismissal, such as a defendant’s amended answer and a letter sent to a judge and placed in the file.357 Having
judges determine whether activity is sufficient to move litigation toward resolution is a practice of “arbitrary efficiency,” which will

347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 374-75.
353. 826 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 2002).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 951.
356. Id. at 950 (citing Samuels v. Palm Beach Motor Cars Ltd. by Simpson, Inc., 618
So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), and Miami Beach Awning Co. v. Heart of the City, Inc.,
565 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)).
357. Id. at 953 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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cause many cases that should be decided on their merits to be thrown
out prematurely at the whim of a judge.358
The argument that it is not fair to the defendant to keep cases on
the docket when the plaintiff is not actively pursuing the case is a
valid concern, but unless the court can come up with a foolproof test
to decide what activity is sufficient to preclude dismissal, the plaintiff will be just as prejudiced, if not more so, by a non-merit based
dismissal of his or her case. Also, the old interpretation of rule
1.420(e) puts attorneys and their clients at a disadvantage because
attorneys have no reasonably certain way of knowing what actions
are sufficient to preclude dismissal.359 Attorneys should not have to
play a guessing game as to what activity will be considered “record
activity.” Further, the Florida Supreme Court should not have to
grant certiorari to every case involving rule 1.420(e) to decide how
the rule should be interpreted, and the new bright-line test prevents
this scenario. The old interpretation, without more concrete guidance
from the court about how to determine record activity, is too ambiguous and affords judges too much leeway as arbitrary gatekeepers.
The bright-line test that the majority puts forth is more manageable,
and it will help courts objectively apply rule 1.420(e).

358. Id. at 954.
359. Petitioner’s Initial Brief on the Merits at 10, Moossun v. Orlando Regional Health
Care, 826 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 2002) (No. SC 00-1472).

